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Abstract 
Epistemic two-dimensional semantics (E2D), advocated by Chalmers (2006) and Jackson (1998), among 
others, aims to restore the link between necessity and a priority seemingly broken by Kripke (1972/1980), 
by showing how armchair access to semantic intensions provides a basis for knowledge of necessary a 
posteriori truths (among other modal claims). The most compelling objections to E2D are that, for one or 
other reason, the requisite intensions are not accessible from the armchair (see, e.g., Wilson 1982, Melnyk 
2008). As we substantiate here, existing versions of E2D are indeed subject to such access-based 
objections. But, we moreover argue, the difficulty lies not with E2D but with the typically presupposed 
conceiving-based epistemology of intensions. Freed from that epistemology, and given the right 
alternative---one where inference to the best explanation (i.e., abduction) provides the operative guide to 
intensions---E2D can meet access-based objections, and fulfill its promise of restoring the desirable link 
between necessity and a priority. This result serves as a central application of Biggs and Wilson 2016 
(summarized here), according to which abduction is an a priori mode of inference. 
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1. Introduction 
Kripke (1972/1980) famously argues that the traditional link between necessity and a priority is 
unsustainable, on grounds that many necessary truths about individuals and natural kinds---e.g., those 
expressed by ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ and ‘water is H2O’---can only be known a posteriori. Though 
these arguments are widely seen as compelling, at least two considerations support trying to reforge the 
traditional link. First, it remains intuitive to suppose that, since necessary truths are true in all possible 
worlds, our knowledge of such truths must be to some extent a priori. Second, much theory and practice 
(philosophical, legal, semantic, scientific, etc.) presupposes that we can know modal truths independently 
of, or at least antecedent to the end of, empirical inquiry. It would thus be good news, both intuitively and 
theoretically, if the traditional link between necessity and a priority could be to some considerable extent 
restored. 
     This is the promise of epistemic two-dimensional semantics (E2D), advocated by Chalmers (e.g., 
2006) and Chalmers and Jackson (2001), among many others.1 E2D characterizes distinct aspects of 
meaning as distinct intensions, and maintains that access to certain intensions provides a basis for a priori 
knowledge of a wide range of modal truths, including a conditional such basis for the truths at issue in 
Kripke's discussion. Hence, to roughly prefigure the E2D strategy, while it is a posteriori that, e.g., water 
is necessarily H2O, our access to appropriate intensions provides a basis for our knowing a priori that if 
water (or the watery stuff) is actually H2O, then water is necessarily H2O; as such, the a posteriori 
contribution to the former necessity claim is limited to discharging the antecedent of a conditional that is 
known a priori. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We count any version of what Chalmers (2006a) calls ‘two-dimensionalism’ as a version of E2D. E2D, then, is more general 
than what Chalmers (2006a) calls ‘epistemic two-dimensionalism’. We explain our choice of terms in footnote 9. In addition to 
his own earlier work, Chalmers (2006a) identifies Jackson (1998, 2004), Braddon-Mitchell (2004), Lewis (1994), and Wong 
(1996) as fellow two-dimensionalists. Others who we take to advocate relevantly similar views include, e.g., Peacocke (1993), 
Boghossian (1996), Henderson and Horgan (2000, 2001), and Gertler (2002). Chalmers (2006a) cites his own earlier work and 
Chalmers and Jackson (2001) as advocating the more specific epistemic two-dimensionalism---though Chalmers and Jackson 
focus less directly on semantics than on reductive explanation. Advocates of a two-dimensional semantic framework who don’t 
endorse any version of E2D include Stalnaker (1978, 1999), Kaplan (1979, 1989), and Davies and Humberstone (1981). See 
Chalmers (2006a, 2004, but especially 2006) for discussion of and further references to various interpretations of this semantic 
(or meta-semantic, as the case may be) framework. 
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     Can E2D fulfill this promise? The most pressing reasons to think not stem from objections that, for 
one or other reason, we cannot access the requisite intensions from the armchair, in which case our access 
to these intensions cannot provide the basis for a priori knowledge, modal or otherwise.2 Although, in our 
view, familiar versions of E2D succumb to such access-based objections, we contend that the difficulty 
lies with the typically presupposed conceiving-based epistemology of intensions, not with E2D as such. 
Freed from that epistemology, and given the right alternative---one where inference to the best 
explanation (i.e., abduction) provides the operative guide to intensions---E2D can meet access-based 
objections, and fulfill its promise of restoring the link between necessity and a priority.3 
     Our plan is as follows. In §1 we sketch the general E2D strategy for restoring the necessity-a priority 
link. In §2 we present, first, the conceiving-based epistemology of intensions (CEI) favored by existing 
proponents of E2D, and second, our preferred abduction-based epistemology of intensions (AEI). In §3 
we argue that E2D+AEI can overcome access-based objections that undermine E2D+CEI; in §4 we argue 
that E2D+AEI can offer more plausible characterizations of actual philosophical practice and 
disagreement than E2D+CEI. In §5-6 we anticipate and respond to two objections to E2D+AEI. 
Specifically, in §5 we respond to the objection that AEI cannot deliver the a priori knowledge that E2D 
requires, since (it is claimed) abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference; and in §6 we respond to the 
objection that AEI too often delivers the “wrong” results. In §7 we offer some concluding remarks. 
 
Before proceeding, we pause for a few preliminaries. 
 To start, following other discussions of E2D, we presuppose that it aims to do each of the following: 
(a) deliver a priori knowledge of semantic facts, which in turn provides a basis for (fairly expansive) 
modal knowledge; (b) base our knowledge of these semantic facts on our access to relevant 
intensions; and (c) explain the a priority of our knowledge of these semantic facts as a consequence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See, e.g., Wilson (1982), Block and Stalnaker (1999), Byrne and Pryor (2006), and Melnyk (2008). 
3 We use ‘abduction’ to label inference to the best explanation for the sake of stylistic simplicity, not because we take inference 
to the best explanation to be Pierce’s abduction. For reasons to distinguish inference to the best explanation from Pierce’s 
abduction see, e.g., Minnameier 2004, Campos 2011, Plutynski 2011, and Mackonis 2013.  
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our specifically armchair access to relevant intensions. Throughout, the semantic facts at issue 
concern what various token expressions (terms, statements), or the concepts they express, refer to in 
various conditions (scenarios, worlds, scenario-world pairs); for example, a relevant semantic fact 
might be that a token use of ‘water’ refers to H2O in the scenario that represents the actual world. 
Melnyk describes and emphasizes the banality of the previous presuppositions in aprioristic semantic 
theorizing of the sort at issue in E2D (2008, pp. 267-268, our italics, but note his citations): 
[C]onceptual or linguistic analysis [is] understood as … settling into an armchair and asking oneself, for 
a variety of hypothetical situations, whether one would apply a given concept, or word, to something in 
that hypothetical situation … the method is taken to be, together with further reflection, a sufficient 
means [for] the discovery a priori of necessary truths that can be formulated by using the given concept 
or word … If conceptual analysis is a viable philosophical methodology, then there must be some 
account, even if it’s very abstract, of what’s going on in our minds when we use the method 
of hypothetical cases, some account which explains how in principle the method is capable of yielding a 
priori knowledge of necessary truths … we have to assume that any such account will construe the 
necessary truths discovered by the method of hypothetical cases as semantic in origin, and then insist on 
the a priori knowability of the relevant semantic facts (see, for example, Peacocke 1993; Boghossian 
1996; Henderson and Horgan, 2000 and 2001; Chalmers and Jackson 2001, especially 320–28; Gertler 
2002). 
 
     These presuppositions about E2D illuminate talk of the ‘epistemology of intensions’ and 
‘knowledge of intensions’, which we engage in below. Such talk is natural, given that E2D aims to 
base our knowledge of semantic facts on our access to intensions, and moreover to explain the a 
priority of our knowledge of semantic facts as a consequence of our specifically armchair access to 
intensions. In any case, if one is concerned that, insofar as intensions are functions, not claims 
(statements, propositions), intensions cannot be the proper content of knowledge or proper target of 
an epistemology, one can rather take such talk to be shorthand for talk of knowledge of the semantic 
facts determined by intensions. More generally, since our case that E2D+AEI is superior to E2D+CEI 
does not turn on this account of the semantic facts at issue in E2D, one can replace this account with 
any alternative that would allow E2D to fulfill its broad promise of restoring the traditional link 
between necessity and a priority (to some considerable extent), and then take us to argue that 
advocates of E2D should adopt AEI, rather than CEI, with respect to those facts---see footnote 5 for 
relevant discussion. 
 Next, again following other discussions of E2D (and of conceptual analysis more generally), we 
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presuppose that whether we can have a priori knowledge of the semantic facts at issue does not turn 
on whether we need experience to become minimally competent with certain expressions or 
associated concepts. Our use of “armchair access to intensions”, “a priori knowledge of semantic 
facts”, and related locutions should be understood accordingly. Moreover, in §4 we discuss in some 
detail what sort of experience, beyond that needed just to gain minimal competence with expressions 
or concepts, is or is not compatible with some knowledge’s being a priori. 
 Next, again following other discussions of E2D, we presuppose that E2D aims to show only that 
access to intensions provides a basis for a priori knowledge of conditionals, which in turn provide a 
basis for knowledge of necessary a posteriori truths, not to show that such truths are known either a 
priori or not at all.  
 Next, again following other discussions of E2D, we presuppose that given the aforementioned reasons 
to restore tradition, the primary link of interest for us is that from necessity to a priority, not that from 
a priority to necessity. We focus, therefore, on the necessary a posteriori, not the contingent a priori---
though, of course, some versions of E2D offer accounts of the contingent a priori. For ease of 
presentation, we focus more specifically on a posteriori necessities that involve natural kinds (e.g., 
water is H2O). 
 Finally, the interest of our discussion in what follows doesn't depend on endorsing E2D. Since AEI 
constitutes a new account of semantic analysis, on which such analysis proceeds by way of abduction, 
and since what we say about the epistemology of the intensions of expressions extends easily to the 
epistemology of the content of concepts, AEI constitutes, mutatis mutandis, a new account of 
conceptual analysis. Hence much of what we say here should engage anyone interested in semantic or 
conceptual analysis. (For example, one can see in AEI a potential resolution of the paradox of 
analysis.) 
 
2. Epistemic two-dimensional semantics 
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Motivated by cases of cognitive informativity, Frege (1918/1997) distinguishes sense and reference as 
different aspects of meaning. In his favored example, someone taking ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to 
refer to the first heavenly body seen in the evening and morning, respectively, might learn that these 
words co-refer. Since this would be to learn something about the meaning of these words, reference is one 
aspect of meaning. But since someone can understand these words, to some extent, without knowing that 
they co-refer, there is also a second aspect of meaning---namely, sense. 
     Frege thinks of sense as intimately connected with a priority. Though there is some unclarity and 
associated controversy about exactly how he understands this connection, one can read Frege as 
suggesting that whether a claim is knowable a priori or not depends entirely on the nature of the relations 
among the senses of its constituent expressions and the nature of our access to these senses and relations. 
So, for example, on Frege's view ‘bachelors are male’ is knowable a priori because the senses of 
‘bachelor’ and ‘male’ “overlap” in the right way and one can “grasp” the senses of ‘bachelor’ and ‘male’ 
in the right way. Though it is unclear, in particular, exactly what Frege takes to constitute the overlap and 
grasp at issue, we can say this much: on his picture, senses and their relations are accessible from the 
armchair, and this access provides a basis for any a priori knowledge that we are in position to have. 
     E2D refines Frege’s picture, so understood, positing aspects of meaning that correspond roughly to 
sense and reference.4 Following Carnap (e.g., 1947/1950), each aspect either is or is represented by an 
intension, where intensions are roughly functions from possible worlds to extensions. More carefully, and 
now following Chalmers (e.g., 2006) in particular, intensions are functions from either scenarios or 
scenario-world pairs to extensions---where a scenario is either a centered world (i.e., one incorporating a 
subject’s perspective) or a maximal set of sentences that is a priori consistent for anyone having our 
concepts and an idealized ability to discover their relations (and where a set is maximal if, modulo 
indeterminacies, for any sentence S, the set includes, directly or by implication, either S or ~S). The 
primary intension of an expression E, corresponding roughly to sense, takes each scenario s to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As per considerations highlighted by Perry (2001), there may be many aspects of meaning, reflecting variations in what’s held 
fixed in different uses of an expression. The two-dimensional semantic framework, including E2D, can be generalized 
accordingly.  
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extension of E in s on the supposition that s is actual. The secondary intension of an expression E, 
corresponding roughly to reference, takes each scenario-world pair <s, w> to the extension of E in w 
given that s is actual. Whether some, many, or all expressions are associated with both intensions is 
disputed; E2D requires that (at least) many natural kind expressions of the sort entering into a posteriori 
necessities are so associated. 
     There are a number of useful ways of characterizing these intensions. On one, primary intensions track 
extensions in contexts of utterance (centered worlds), and secondary intensions track extensions in 
contexts of evaluation (possible worlds), given a context of utterance (a particular centering within our 
world). On another, primary intensions track extensions in ‘worlds considered as actual’ (epistemic 
possibilities), and secondary intensions track extensions in ‘worlds considered as counterfactual’ 
(metaphysical possibilities), holding fixed which world is actual. 
     While these comparisons are each illuminating, what matters for us is this: on E2D, primary and 
secondary intensions correspond to what we might call, more specifically, epistemic sense and 
metaphysical reference. Epistemic sense is an aspect of meaning that can be accessed from the armchair, 
i.e., can be known a priori, and metaphysical reference is an aspect of meaning that, for many 
expressions, can be accessed only through additional experience, i.e., can be known only a posteriori. 
Correspondingly, primary intensions encode what any suitably competent speaker can know about the 
extensions of her expressions from the armchair, and secondary intensions encode an aspect of meaning 
which sometimes depends on how things are at whatever world is actual (in a way that precludes 
complete armchair access), and which may enter into certain necessary truths. 
     How do primary and secondary intensions assist in (re)forging the link between a priority and 
necessity? Doing this requires connecting the intensions, so that one who knows the primary intension of 
some relevant (e.g., natural kind) expression can infer something significant about its secondary 
intension---hence about necessity. But even an idealized subject cannot know a priori that water is in fact 
H2O, as is required to know the secondary intension of ‘water’. What, then, can one know a priori about 
secondary intensions, metaphysical reference, and necessity? 
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     Thinking in terms of a two-dimensional matrix assists in understanding how E2D answers this 
question (cf. Chalmers 2006a, following Stalnaker 1999), as follows: 
 H2O-world XYZ-world  
H2O-scenario H2O H2O . . . 
XYZ-scenario XYZ XYZ . . . 
… … … … 
 
The desired link between a priority and necessity (hence the justification for drawing the matrix as 
involving overlapping primary and secondary intensions) is then forged via three suppositions: 
•  First, we have in-principle armchair access to the space of scenarios---that is, to what worlds 
might have been actual, so to speak---represented in the leftmost column of the matrix. 
•  Second, we have in-principle armchair access to the extension of any token expression at any 
scenario on the hypothesis that the scenario is actual. In other words, we can have a priori 
knowledge of primary intensions, represented by the diagonal of the matrix. 
•  Third, we have in-principle armchair access to what the extension of any token expression 
would be at any world, on the hypothesis that any given scenario is actual. In other words, for 
any scenario s and expression E, we can have a priori knowledge of what the secondary 
intension of E would be, if s were actual. More generally, we can have a priori knowledge of 
what we call generalized secondary intensions (and Chalmers calls two-dimensional 
intensions). 
     Since generalized secondary intensions are central to E2D, it is worth contrasting them with ordinary 
secondary intensions. The secondary intension of any token expression E takes as input the actual world 
and any possible world w, and gives as output the extension of E at w. The generalized secondary 
intension takes as input any scenario s and any possible world w, and outputs the extension of E at w on 
the hypothesis that s is actual. For example, the secondary intension of an appropriate token of ‘water’ 
takes as input the actual world (where the watery stuff is H2O) and any world w, and returns the extension 
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of ‘water’ at w---i.e., H2O; the generalized secondary intension takes as input any scenario (e.g., a 
scenario in in which the watery stuff is XYZ), and any world w, and returns the extension of that use of 
‘water’ at w on the assumption that s is actual, in this case XYZ. One might say that generalized 
secondary intensions track extensions in worlds that are counterfactual relative to a given scenario 
considered as actual, whether or not that scenario corresponds to the actual world. 
     Given these suppositions, a priori knowledge of intensions provides a basis for knowledge of a wide 
range of modal truths. As per the first bulleted supposition, the leftmost column of the matrix (the space 
of scenarios) can be specified independently of experience. As per the second, the diagonal of the matrix 
(the primary intension) can be specified independently of experience, indicating that “epistemic 
necessity” and a priority are deeply linked. As per the third, the remaining cells in the matrix (which fill 
in the generalized secondary intensions) can be specified independently of experience, indicating that 
metaphysical necessity and a priority are also deeply linked. 
     How significant is this final link? In knowing the primary intension of ‘water’, one knows a series of 
conditionals: if the watery stuff is actually H2O, then ‘water’ refers to H2O in the actual world; if the 
watery stuff is actually XYZ, then ‘water’ refers to XYZ in the actual world; and so on.5 In knowing the 
generalized secondary intension of ‘water’, one knows another series of conditionals: if ‘water’ refers to 
H2O in the actual world, then ‘water’ refers to H2O in all worlds; and so on for XYZ, etc. From 
knowledge of these intensions, one can deduce a third set of conditionals: if the watery stuff is actually 
H2O, then ‘water’ refers to H2O in all worlds; and so on for XYZ, etc. One who knows (through 
experience) that the watery stuff is actually H2O can thus use a priori knowledge of two intensions 
(primary and generalized secondary) to infer that water is necessarily H2O. The only essential role for 
experience in knowing this a posteriori necessity lies in experience's being required to discharge the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 One who prefers a different account of the semantic facts at issue in E2D could substitute the following for the above 
conditionals without impacting the dialectic here: ‘if the watery stuff is actually H2O, then all samples of water are samples of 
H2O in the actual world’; ‘if the watery stuff is actually XYZ, then all samples of water are samples of XYZ in the actual world’; 
and so on. Notice that ‘water’ no longer occurs inside quotes in the consequent of these conditionals, but the conditionals 
themselves are now (token) sentences, and hence, inside quotes. With some changes in form, we could even leave aside language, 
substituting appropriate propositions for these sentences (e.g., by removing the quotes from the above sentences)---with the result 
that E2D would deliver knowledge of the content of concepts/propositions, rather than the intensions of expressions. 
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antecedent of a conditional (encoded by the primary intension) that is known a priori. Generalizing, it 
appears that with the exception of knowledge about which scenario corresponds to the actual world, 
everything about modality can be known a priori, on broadly semantic grounds. So, given knowledge of 
which world is actual, any suitably competent speaker can, in principle, infer all necessary truths, 
including necessary a posteriori truths, from a priori, broadly semantic knowledge.6, 7 
     This, schematically, is how E2D aims to restore the traditional link between necessity and a priority. 
The restoration is not perfect, since it remains that some necessary truths cannot be known without a 
posteriori knowledge of which world is actual. The restoration is nonetheless significant, however, since 
it provides a post-Kripkean basis for gaining a priori knowledge of a wide range of modal truths, 
revealing everything about modality to one who knows which world is actual, and much about modality 
even to one not in possession of the latter information.8, 9 
 
2. Two epistemologies of intensions 
The above characterization of E2D leaves open how one accesses intensions from the armchair, thereby 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There may be disagreement about which conditionals the primary intension encodes, of course. Perhaps the primary intension 
for some appropriate use of ‘water’ encodes conditionals relevant to scenarios in which the most common clear, drinkable liquid 
in the actual world is half water and half XYZ, or is wildly disjunctive (see Bealer 2002, p. 109 for relevant discussion, though 
he’s no fan of E2D). There are limits, however. One cannot hold that an ordinary use of ‘water’ refers to whatever is at the 
beginning of the causal chain that led to one’s acquisition of ‘water’, since ‘water’ does not refer, e.g., to an evil demon, even if 
the chain begins with such an entity—though see Chalmers (2005) for (at least inspiration for) an opposing view. 
7 Our three suppositions correspond to four of what Chalmers (2006a, p. 585) calls the “[f]ive core claims of two-
dimensionalism”—specifically, to his first, third, fourth, and fifth theses. We are neutral as regards his second core claim, which 
identifies a compositional relationship between complex and simple expressions, but see no reason to exclude this claim here. 
8 Note that to know which world is actual is not thereby to know the extension of every token expression at the actual world. For 
example, scenarios understood as sets of sentences include only semantically neutral expressions, where, informally, an 
expression is semantically neutral if its extension in scenarios considered as counterfactual does not depend on which scenario is 
considered as actual (cf., Chalmers 2006, p. 87). No ordinary use of ‘water’ is semantically neutral, since whether it refers to H2O 
or XYZ in scenarios considered as counterfactual depends on which scenario is considered as actual. As such, to entertain a 
scenario s is not thereby to know the extension of ‘water’ at s, even if one can know the extension of ‘water’ at s a priori. Most 
names, natural kind words, and indexical words resemble ‘water’ in this respect. By contrast, many token expressions plausibly 
are semantically neutral. Chalmers offers ordinary uses of ‘and’, ‘philosopher’, ‘friend’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘cause’ (p. 86); 
other possible candidates include ‘lake’, ‘stream’, ‘clear’, ‘potable’, ‘H2O’, and ‘XYZ’. Scenarios trivially include only these 
sorts of expressions. 
9 We pause to explain our decision to use the label ‘epistemic two dimensional semantics’, rather than either ‘two-
dimensionalism’ or ‘epistemic two-dimensionalism’. Chalmers (2004, p. 166) distinguishes “epistemic” from “contextual” 
interpretations of two dimensional semantic frameworks, maintaining, as we agree, that only epistemic interpretations can fulfill 
E2D’s promise of restoring (to any considerable extent) the traditional link between necessity and a priority. Since we are 
interested only in interpretations that can fulfill this promise, we are interested in specifically epistemic interpretations; hence our 
moniker includes the qualifier ‘epistemic’. And since we are exploring epistemic interpretations of two-dimensional semantic 
frameworks, we use the label ‘epistemic two dimensional semantics’; this designation moreover serves the purpose of 
distinguishing our use from the specific view that Chalmers (2006a) calls ‘epistemic two-dimensionalism’, which use invokes 
(what we take to be) a misguided (conceiving-based) epistemology of intensions. 
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acquiring a priori knowledge of intensions---that is, leaves open the epistemology of intensions. How, 
exactly, is one supposed to gain this knowledge? To say, as proponents of E2D commonly do, that a 
priori deliberation involves 'conceptual analysis' or 'idealized rational reflection' does not go much further 
in elucidating the operative process. In what follows, we first motivate the claim that standard versions of 
E2D more specifically implement a conceiving-based epistemology of intensions (at least insofar as they 
presume a particular epistemology of intensions), next sketch our abduction-based alternative, then 
briefly compare the two. 
     Among advocates of E2D, Chalmers (in various works) and Chalmers and Jackson (in their 2001) say 
the most about how the conceiving at issue works. Accordingly, we focus on their work while describing 
a conceiving-based epistemology of intensions (CEI). We expect our concerns about CEI to apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to the epistemology of intensions operative in any existing version of E2D. 
     To be clear, Chalmers and Jackson (2001) discuss conceiving qua method for identifying the content 
of concepts/thoughts, not qua method for identifying the intensions of terms/statements. Nonetheless, we 
use their 2001 to characterize the conceiving at issue in CEI, since what they say about the role of 
conceiving and rational reflection in investigating the content of concepts/thoughts precisely parallels 
what they say elsewhere about the role of conceiving and reflection in investigating the intensions of 
terms/statements; and since, moreover, Chalmers (2006a, p. 588) cites Chalmers and Jackson (2001) as 
advocating E2D, which suggests that he intends their discussion of the epistemology of content to transfer 
to the epistemology of intensions. Because Chalmers and Jackson focus on the content of 
concepts/thoughts, rather than on the intensions of terms/statements, when we use their work to elucidate 
the conceiving at issue in CEI, and more generally when we compare our thoughts on the a priority of 
abduction to their thoughts on the a priority of conceiving, we shift freely between discussing, e.g., the 
extensions of concepts/thoughts and the extensions of terms/statements. 
 
2.1 A conceiving-based epistemology of intensions (CEI) 
It is natural to assume that rational reflection and a priority go hand in hand. As Chalmers elaborates, “a 
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sentence token is a priori when it expresses an a priori thought”, where an a priori thought is one that “can 
be conclusively non-experientially justified on idealized rational reflection” (2006, p. 98). Here to be 
conclusively non-experientially justified is to be indefeasibly justified by idealized rational reflection 
alone; but how exactly are we to understand rational reflection and its idealized counterpart, applied, in 
particular, to the conditionals at the heart of the E2D strategy? Relatedly, what exactly is involved in 
idealized "conceptual analysis" or "a priori entailment" (as these are seen by, e.g., Chalmers and Jackson 
2001)? 
     Answers from proponents of E2D tend to be more specific about what rational reflection (or variations 
on this theme; we will not carry all these forward) is not than about what it is. Hence, Chalmers and 
Jackson (2001) start by noting that one may reason about a Gettier case (as antecedent) to the rejection of 
the application of the concept of knowledge (as consequent) even in the absence of an explicit definition 
of knowledge, saying, "This pattern, whereby a conditional ability to evaluate a concept's extension yields 
elucidation of a concept without a finite counterexample-free analysis, is illustrated very clearly in the 
case of 'knowledge'" (p. 323); and they repeatedly maintain that in this case as well as those involving 
natural kinds that are more typically the target of the E2D strategy, "empirical information plays no 
essential role in justifying belief in [the associated] conditionals (p. 321; see also p. 323, p. 325, p. 333, 
and elsewhere). But what exactly is the "conditional ability" in question? They go on to say: 
Once an essential role for explicit definitions is eschewed, the model of conceptual analysis that 
emerges is something like the following. When given sufficient information about a hypothetical 
scenario, subjects are frequently in position to identify the extension of a given concept, on 
reflection, under the hypothesis that the scenario in question obtains. Analysis of a concept proceeds 
at least in part through consideration of a concept's extension within hypothetical scenarios, and 
noting regularities that emerge. [...] What emerges as a result of this process may or may not be an 
explicit definition, but it will at least give useful information about the features in virtue of which a 
concept applies to the world. [...] The possibility of this sort of analysis is grounded in the following 
general feature of our concepts. If a subject possesses a concept and has unimpaired rational 
processes, then sufficient empirical information about the actual world puts a subject in a position to 
identify the concept's extension. (p. 322) 
 
But what exactly is it to engage in "consideration of a concept's extension", or to be "in a position to 
identify [a] concept's extension"? Here, one might recall Melnyk’s suggestion that “conceptual analysis is 
a viable philosophical methodology” only if there is “some account, even if it is very abstract, of what’s 
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going on in our minds when we use the method of hypothetical cases” (2008, pp. 267-268). 
     Other broadly gestural characterizations include that "sufficient information about an epistemic 
possibility enables a subject to know what a concept's extension will be [in that scenario]" (p. 323), that 
"possession of a concept such as 'knowledge' or 'water' bestows a conditional ability to identify the 
concept's extension under a hypothetical epistemic possibility, given sufficient information about that 
epistemic possibility and sufficient reasoning" (p. 324); that "a priori conditionals will reflect the way in 
which we can identify a concept's referent" (p. 325); that "if we possess a concept, then sufficient 
empirical information E enables us to conclusively identify the concept's extension and to know 
associated truths C [...] whether the information in E is actual or hypothetical (p. 325); that relevant non-
trivial information about the scenario in the antecedent is "sufficient [...] for determining the truth" of a 
claim involving the concept in the consequent (p. 333) ; that given the relevant non-trivial information 
about the scenario, we can "process this information on a priori grounds" to "ascertain the truth of" a 
claim involving the concept in the consequent (p. 335). To our mind, none of these gestures do much to 
positively characterize the intended methodology. 
     Still, given certain specified commitments, a picture emerges on which the preferred epistemology of 
intensions involves conceivability, broadly construed, where the justificatory role of conceiving is 
assumed not to involve broadly abductive reasoning (hence it is that our proposed alternative is a genuine 
alternative to the standardly operative epistemology of intensions). We raise to salience three 
considerations in support of this claim. 
     To start, that conceivability is what is ultimately at issue is supported by Chalmers's (2002) defense of 
conceivability as entailing possibility. Here Chalmers also expands on the notion of conceivability, noting 
that it may be positive or negative, and prima facie or idealized; and he clarifies that for purposes of 
conclusively justifying beliefs about intensions and associated modal claims, what is crucially at issue is 
idealized positive conceiving, understood as involving a kind of rational perceiving or 'modal imagining': 
Positive notions of conceivability require that one can form some sort of positive conception of a 
situation in which S is the case. One can place the varieties of positive conceivability under the 
broad rubric of imagination: to positively conceive of a situation is to in some sense imagine a 
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specific configuration of objects and properties [...] Different notions of conceivability correspond 
to different notions of imagination. One such notion is tied to perceptual imagination. A subject 
perceptually imagines that S when the subject has a perceptual mental image that represents S as 
being the case. [...] There is a sense in which we can imagine situations that do not seem to be 
potential contents of perceptual experiences [e.g.,] molecules of H2O, or Germany winning the 
Second World War [, or] the existence of an invisible being that leaves no trace on perception. [...] 
In this case, we have an intuition of (or as of) a world in which S, or at least of (or as of) a situation 
in which S, where a situation is (roughly) a configuration of objects and properties within a world. 
We might say that in these cases, one can modally imagine that P. One modally imagines that P if 
one modally imagines a world that verifies P, or a situation that verifies P. (pp. 150-151) 
 
Here we have a positive characterization of the intended methodology, in at least certain of its 
applications. But, however exactly conceiving is understood, there are two clear reasons to think that 
abductive inference is not any part of conceiving. First is that Chalmers, Jackson, and other familiar 
proponents of E2D take the products of conceivability to be conclusive or indefeasible. As we will argue 
in §5, there is a case to be made that abductive reasoning is properly understood as a priori, but is 
inconclusive nevertheless. Second, Chalmers and Jackson are explicit—when arguing, in particular, 
against Block and Stalnaker's (1999) claim that the justification for the conditional claims at the heart of 
E2D might rely on broadly abductive considerations (e.g., simplicity)—that in their view abductive 
considerations do not play any 'essential justificatory' role in the cases at hand. While all parties to that 
particular dispute assume (incorrectly, in our view) that abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference,10 
independent of this issue Chalmers's and Jackson's response makes clear that the standardly assumed 
epistemology of intensions underlying E2D is one that does not appeal to abduction nor to any of the 
inferential principles (of simplicity, parsimony, fruitfulness, etc.) standardly taken to underlie abduction 
(see especially Chalmers and Jackson, pp. 342-350).11 
 
2.2. An abduction-based epistemology of intensions (AEI) 
Our preferred epistemology of intensions---AEI---replaces conceiving with abduction. Abduction, as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Though Block and Stalnaker (1999) maintain that their argument that abductive principles play an ineliminable justificatory 
role in assessing claims about reduction stands even if abductive principles are “as a priori as you like” (29). 
11 One might wonder, as a referee did, if the open-texturedness of the operative notion of conceivability might stretch still further 
to allow all abductive considerations to enter into CEI. Perhaps, but if so, then Chalmers and Jackson, among other proponents of 
E2D, will have to retract not just their assumption that idealized rational reflection/positive conceivability results in conclusively 
justified beliefs or thoughts (hence will have to retract their usual reply to Block and Stalnaker), but also much of the 
argumentation they offer in response to access-based concerns with their view; for as we'll argue down the line, on an abduction-
based epistemology of intensions, many of these concerns allow for responses much different from (and better than) those that 
Chalmers, Jackson, and others provide. 
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understand it, proceeds by assessing the extent to which a range of candidate theories satisfies the 
(perhaps competing) dictates of various non-demonstrative inferential principles, including, for example, 
principles of ontological parsimony, explanatory comprehensiveness, and fruitfulness. Such principles are 
sometimes called theoretical virtues; we typically call them abductive principles. To use abduction when 
deciding among competing theories is to choose the theory that best explains some target (i.e., the 
explanandum), where the underlying abductive principles and their weightings determine how theories 
are ranked. This sketch leaves open exactly which principles and weightings are at issue. We leave certain 
details open both because they are not required to motivate our alternative epistemology of intensions, 
and because no specific set of principles or way of balancing them is uncontroversial; as will later become 
clear, this flexibility is a feature, not a bug, of our approach.12 
     What theories and explananda are at issue for primary intensions? The candidate intensions determine 
the theories, which are representations in propositional form of the intensions. Consider, for example, 
three such theories for an ordinary token of ‘water’. 
(i) In any scenario considered as actual, ‘water’ refers to the basis of life. 
(ii) In any scenario considered as actual, ‘water’ refers to the watery stuff.  
(iii) In any scenario considered as actual, ‘water’ refers to H2O.  
The first theory represents the intension that delivers the basis of life at any scenario it receives as input, 
regardless of what superficial or “deep” properties that basis has; hence in the scenario that represents the 
actual world, samples of that basis are samples of both (and only) watery stuff and H2O, but in other 
scenarios they will be neither. The second represents the intension that delivers the watery stuff at any 
scenario it receives as input, regardless of the chemical composition of that stuff---in the scenario that 
represents the actual world, samples of that watery stuff are samples of (and only of) H2O, but in other 
scenarios they might be samples of some other variety. The third represents the intension that delivers 
H2O at any scenario it receives as input. To choose among competing primary intensions for ‘water’ is to 
choose among theories such as (i)-(iii). These theories aim to explain, inter alia, what we would (or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For more on abduction and abductive principles, see Lipton (1991/2004). 
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should) think when contemplating various scenarios (e.g., what we would or should take the extension of 
an ordinary token of ‘water’ to be given various empirical results, how we would or should act if someone 
dying of thirst calls for ‘water’ in an XYZ-scenario, and so on). 
     How might abductive principles enter into ranking these theories? The third theory is in one respect 
less explanatorily comprehensive than the other two, since unlike these others, it cannot explain the 
thoughts or actions of those contemplating scenarios in which the watery stuff is actually XYZ (or 
anything different from H2O). Of course, this is not a decisive case against (iii), let alone for (i) or (ii); 
still, it illustrates that abductive principles (in this case, a principle that captures the virtue of explanatory 
comprehensiveness) can play a role in assessing theories of primary intensions.13 
     What theories and explananda are at issue for generalized secondary intensions? Again, the candidate 
intensions determine the theories, which are just propositional representations of the intensions. Consider, 
for example, three such theories for an ordinary token of ‘water’. 
(i') In any world considered as counterfactual relative to any scenario considered as actual, 
‘water’ refers to the basis of life. 
(ii')  In any world considered as counterfactual relative to any scenario considered as actual, 
‘water’ refers to the watery stuff. 
(iii')  In any world considered as counterfactual relative to any scenario considered as actual, 
‘water’ refers to the common underlying compositional structure of the watery stuff in 
the scenario considered as actual (e.g., in any world considered as counterfactual relative 
to an H2O-scenario, ‘water’ refers to H2O; in any world considered as counterfactual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 One might have the following concern: given AEI, our relevant thoughts and actions are the explananda on the basis of which 
we should choose among competing primary intensions for any given term; CEI instructs us to make that choice on the basis of 
our intuitive judgments; the thoughts and actions at issue given AEI just are (or are equivalent to) the intuitive judgments at issue 
given CEI; so, AEI and CEI will invariably deliver the same results. Against this concern, we respond: because abduction is 
ampliative where conceiving is not, abduction can, e.g., fill out indeterminate primary intensions where conceiving cannot (since 
abduction can deliver extensions for expressions at scenarios where conceiving cannot). It is primarily this difference in the mode 
of inference itself, rather than a difference between the “input” available to abduction versus that available to conceiving, that is 
crucial vis-à-vis primary intensions. 
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relative to an XYZ-scenario, ‘water’ refers to XYZ; and so on).14 
The first theory represents the intension that, for any scenario world pair <s, w>, delivers the basis of life 
at w, regardless what the basis of life is at the actual world. The second represents the intension that, for 
any scenario world pair <s, w>, delivers the watery stuff at w, regardless of the compositional structure 
that water has at s or w. The third represents the intension that, for any scenario world pair <s, w>, 
delivers whatever at w has the same underlying compositional structure as is had by the watery stuff at s. 
To choose among competing generalized secondary intensions for ‘water’ is to choose among theories 
such as (i')-(iii'). These theories aim to explain, among other things, that in the actual world all and only 
samples of water are samples of H2O. 
     How might abductive principles enter into ranking these theories? The third theory arguably explains 
the actual coincidence of samples of water and samples of H2O in a more ontologically parsimonious way 
than the other two, since unlike these others, it is consistent with the claim that water and H2O, qua 
natural kinds (however exactly kinds are understood---e.g., as properties) are identical.  
     To see this, first note that notwithstanding that applying the E2D strategy requires setting up the 2D 
matrix, so to speak, and hence contemplating extensions of expressions in or relative to other scenarios---
that is, contemplating goings-on in or counterfactual to other worlds considered as actual---on the usual 
assumption that only one world is in fact actual, the associated semantic facts are considered to be 
epistemically, but not metaphysically, relevant. I.e., even if we can make sense of its having turned out 
that the actual world was one where ‘water’ referred to XYZ, this counter-actual semantic fact wouldn't 
be taken by proponents of the claim that water and H2O are identical kinds to undermine that claim. 
Hence so far as the metaphysics of the referent of ‘water’ is concerned, it suffices to attend only to (what 
is usually called) the secondary intension, tracking extensions in worlds considered as counterfactual 
relative to the scenario (world) that is (in fact) actual.  
     Keeping this latter point in mind, it is clear that of the three theories, only the third is compatible with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Of course, some theories will be more difficult to express because the underlying candidate intension is more unruly—perhaps 
taking an H2O-scenario and arbitrary world w as input and delivering all and only watery stuff at w as output, but taking an XYZ-
scenario and w as input and delivering all and only XYZ at w as output. 
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water's being identical with H2O; for only this theory ensures that the referent of ‘water’ at counterfactual 
worlds, relative to the actual world scenario, is (as the kind identity requires) H2O, whereas the other 
theories do not ensure this, since the (chemical) basis of life and the (chemical) composition of the watery 
stuff might be different at different counterfactual worlds, relative to the actual world scenario. Hence, 
while all three theories can explain the actual coincidence of water and H2O, theory (iii') does so in the 
most ontologically parsimonious fashion. Of course, this is not a decisive case for (iii'), let alone against 
(i') or (ii'); still, it illustrates that abductive principles (in this case, a principle of ontological parsimony) 
can play a role in assessing theories of secondary intensions. 
     Finally, to be clear, this sketch is not meant to constitute instructions for using abduction to assess 
intensions, though some do reason along similar lines.15 Rather, it is meant to differentiate AEI from CEI 
while giving one a sense, however schematic, of how abduction can be used to identify intensions. 
 
2.3 Inferring ordinary truths 
Two versions of E2D are now on the table, E2D+AEI and E2D+CEI. We can further illuminate 
differences between them by considering how each treats inferences from base truths to ordinary truths.16 
Why is semantics relevant to such inferences? When identifying the extension of an expression E at a 
scenario s, one must begin with a description of s which excludes E, but includes enough information to 
determine E's extension at s. Typically, this is accomplished by entertaining a description that uses 
expressions that are, in some relevant sense, more basic than E. Rather than involving ‘water’, for 
example, a description might involve ‘clear’, ‘potable’, ‘hydrogen’, etc. Accordingly, inferring ordinary 
truths from base truths corresponds rather precisely to identifying primary intensions, such that the 
epistemology for one transfers to the other. We can thus contrast E2D+CEI with E2D+AEI, qua 
epistemologies of primary intensions, by noting how each differently schematizes inferences from base 
truths to ordinary truths. 
     As per Chalmers (2006), let ‘D’ be a sentence expressing all base truths at a scenario s (i.e., base 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See, e.g., Block and Stalnaker 1999 and Biggs (2011). 
16 Chalmers (2006) uses the labels base and ordinary truths for, roughly, fundamental and derivative truths respectively. 
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claims that would be base truths if s were actual), and ‘A’ be any sentence expressing an ordinary truth at 
s (i.e., an ordinary claim that would be an ordinary truth if s were actual). The inference from D to A can 
be schematized neutrally: 
D           
D → A   
  ∴  A [modus ponens] 
In step 1, one accepts D as a working hypothesis. In step 2, one uses the epistemology of intensions to 
determine that A follows from D. In step 3, one deduces A. E2D+CEI and E2D+AEI disagree about the 
justification for step 2: the former holds that step 2 is justified conclusively through conceiving; the latter 
holds that step 2 is justified inconclusively through abduction. Since each holds that inferences of this 
kind are always justified, the following schematizations for E2D+CEI (left) and E2D+AEI (right) are 
more perspicuous: 
D                    D               
 ∴ A [conceiving] ∴ A [abduction, appealing to abductive principles a1, a2, … an] 
(We leave it to the reader to generate a similar contrast of E2D+CEI with E2D+AEI qua epistemologies 
of generalized secondary intensions.) 
     A key similarity between CEI and AEI is now clear: each offers an inferential principle. Two 
differences are also clear. First, AEI is methodologically broader than CEI, in incorporating the full 
spectrum of theoretical desiderata at issue in abductive deliberation. Second, AEI, unlike CEI, only aims 
to deliver inconclusive knowledge. Though this renders AEI-based knowledge of modal claims similarly 
inconclusive, so long as AEI typically tracks what intensions are in fact, the link between a priority and 
necessity will be substantially reforged. Indeed, as we will see next, it is thanks to both of these 
differences that E2D+AEI---abductive two-dimensionalism---delivers different results than E2D+CEI vis-
à-vis both primary and secondary intensions, is able to overcome the access-based objections that 
undermine E2D+CEI, and is able to make better sense of actual philosophical practice and disagreement 
than can E2D+CEI. 	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3. Access-based objections 
The most compelling challenges to E2D are due to various access-based objections, according to which 
we cannot, for one reason or another, have a priori knowledge of the primary (hence secondary) 
intensions supposed to provide a basis for our knowledge of modal truths. Here, we consider two of these 
objections, and argue that while each is pressing against E2D+CEI, neither is pressing against abductive 
two-dimensionalism. Along the way, we show that which primary intensions E2D delivers sometimes 
depends on which epistemology of intensions is operative.17 
 
 
3.1 Insuperable semantic indeterminacy 
According to the first access-based objection, there is more indeterminacy in natural kind predicates than 
E2D can tolerate. Recall that on E2D our a priori knowledge of primary and generalized secondary 
intensions together provides the basis for any modal knowledge that we have. Hence on E2D, modal 
knowledge is as sparse as (insuperable) indeterminacy is widespread. E2D aims to account for our 
having (in principle) knowledge of a wide range of modal truths, including necessary a posteriori truths 
about natural kinds. As such, widespread (insuperable) indeterminacy of natural kind predicates would 
undermine E2D. 
     We argue below that there is widespread indeterminacy in natural kind predicates, that cannot be 
overcome through conceiving alone. Our discussion is compatible with two understandings of the 
indeterminacy at issue. It could be that, while the natural kind predicates at issue determinately express a 
certain concept, many such concepts are indeterminate, in that they may not, in and of themselves (and 
given CEI), determine their application (or that of associated predicates) in the full range of scenarios. 
Alternatively, it could be that which of multiple completely determinate concepts a given natural kind 
predicate expresses is indeterminate. Nothing we say turns on which understanding one chooses. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 To be clear, we think that some objections to E2D do not hinge on which epistemology of intensions is operative, and can be 
overcome by E2D+CEI. We place objections from, e.g., Stalnaker (1999, 2001) and Soames (2005) in this category. For 
responses to these objections that we take to succeed, see Chalmers (2006, §4); for response to the latter in particular see 
Chalmers (2006b). 
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     One might worry that on either understanding, the claim that the intension for a term does not 
determine its extension at some scenarios implies that it has no primary intension, not, as we may seem to 
suggest, that it has a primary intension that we cannot access. We call indeterminacy-based objections 
access-based objections, nonetheless, in order to emphasize that the indeterminacy at issue only appears 
to be insuperable if one adopts the wrong account of how we access intensions; that said, nothing 
important turns on this label. 
     The case for widespread indeterminacy begins with Wilson’s (1982, 2006) observation that our 
(idealized) application of natural kind predicates can be determined by arbitrary factors. In one of 
Wilson’s toy cases, whether members of an isolated tribe put airplanes in the extension of ‘bird’ depends 
on whether the first airplane they encounter is overhead or on the ground. If such historical accident partly 
determines whether ‘bird’ applies to airplanes, then, Wilson reasonably assumes, the full range of the 
predicate's extension is not antecedently determined. Relatedly, although Wilson does not discuss this 
kind of case, ordering phenomena in Sorites series suggest that arbitrary factors can influence predicate 
application: the breaking point in applications of ‘blue’ may depend non-systematically both on where 
along the spectrum one starts and on psychological factors (cf. Raffman 1994). 
     In his early work, Chalmers (1996) says that such indeterminacy is “no problem” for E2D:  
There may of course be borderline cases in which it’s indeterminate whether a concept would refer 
to a certain object if a given world turned out to be actual. This is no problem: we can allow 
indeterminacies in a primary intension, as we sometimes allow indeterminacies in reference in our 
own world (p. 364). 
 
Chalmers is right that E2D can tolerate some indeterminacy. But as above, it cannot allow that 
insuperable indeterminacy is widespread without undermining its raison d’etre of restoring the link 
between necessity and a priority. 
     Anticipating this difficulty in his 1996, Chalmers suggests that conceivers can eliminate indeterminacy 
from primary intensions by foreseeing relevant accidents. In Wilson’s case, Chalmers says that one 
“might try to classify these two different scenarios [airplane first seen in the sky or on the ground, 
respectively] as different ways for the actual world to turn out, and therefore retain a fixed, detailed 
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primary intension” (p. 364). On this strategy, the fully determinate primary intension of ‘bird’ includes 
planes in its extension if the tribe members first see a plane overhead, but not if they first see it on the 
ground. Either way, according to the suggestion, indeterminacy is resolved. 
     Chalmers’s suggestion has traction against the objection only if conceivers can foresee how intensions 
are sensitive to accidents. But, as we see it, a deeper lesson of Wilson’s case is that the influence of 
accidents cannot be foreseen, at least not by conceiving alone: determinism and such aside, those using 
conceiving alone might apply ‘bird’ differently even relative to the same historical facts. After all, there 
are any number of respects of dissimilarity between airplanes and birds, even when the former are in 
flight, and a minor difference in attention to these features might result in a different decision about 
whether ‘bird’ applies. We can register, post-hoc, extensions resulting from whatever decision was in fact 
made, but that does not show that anyone can antecedently identify these extensions and corresponding 
intensions through conceiving alone. 
     More recently, Chalmers (2012) accepts that such indeterminacy may be insuperable. In discussing 
Wilson’s cases, he says it “is plausible” that “later extensions [of the kind of expressions at issue in 
Wilson’s cases] depend on idiosyncratic developments, and verdicts about such cases are not 
determinately prefigured in a user’s original use of an expression” (p. 231). In the context where he 
makes this concession, Chalmers is discussing his scrutability thesis,18 not E2D, and so he continues by 
noting that “widespread indeterminacy is quite compatible with the scrutability thesis” (p. 231). These are 
compatible, he thinks, because in cases where the predicate at issue is indeterminate, relevant statements 
including that predicate will themselves be indeterminate, rather than true or false, and so, such 
indeterminacy does not prevent one from deducing any ordinary truth at s; for example, at an appropriate 
scenario in which the native’s never encounter a plane, their ordinary uses of ‘bird’ remain indeterminate, 
but so do claims such as that ordinarily expressed by ‘Planes are birds’. This reply may satisfy the 
dialectical needs Chalmers has while defending the scrutability thesis, but it does not block our Wilson-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Roughly, this is the claim that deploying one’s semantic competence allows one to deduce, at any scenario s, any given truth at 
s from a complete list of base truths at s. As per the discussion in section 3.3, this scrutability thesis is intimately related to issues 
surrounding the epistemology of intensions. 
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inspired objection to E2D+CEI. Again, E2D aims to explain our knowledge of a wide range of modal 
truths, including those involving natural kinds, as a consequence of our a priori knowledge of intensions; 
this aim can be achieved only if a correspondingly wide range of intensions are determinate.19 
     Seizing on the imprecision of “wide range”, one might reply that E2D can survive what indeterminacy 
there is; after all, the objector claims, even if such indeterminacy is not uncommon, it is not the norm, and 
crucially, is irrelevant to paradigm necessary a posteriori truths. E2D+CEI, then, can do the work it set 
out to do, despite such indeterminacy. We disagree. To start, we think Wilson-style cases are common. 
But, more importantly, they are not the only kind of cases in which application of an expression reflects 
factors whose influence is not antecedently encoded in the expression itself. The historical record supplies 
many such cases: ‘acid’ initially was taken to refer to only oxygenated substances, but was later applied to 
HCL, for theoretical reasons now largely discarded; dispute remains over whether Newtonian uses of ‘mass’ apply in relativistic contexts; the decision to classify whales as mammals was a controversial 
affair; there’s the infamous resolution declassifying Pluto as a planet. In these cases, the indeterminacy 
was not resolved through accident, but rather, through non-demonstrative reasoning of one sort or 
another---typically, broadly abductive reasoning.20 So, summing up: factors influencing predicate 
application can involve historical accident (as in Wilson’s toy case), variable psychological features (as 
for ‘blue’), and non-demonstrative reasoning (as for ‘acid’, ‘mass’, ‘mammals’, and ‘planet’), none of which 
are antecedently encoded in relevant expression themselves; hence, widespread indeterminacy.  
     While E2D+CEI cannot overcome this indeterminacy, it is no problem for abductive two-
dimensionalism. For, when considering whether to apply an expression in a given scenario, abductors can 
consider not only historical accident and psychological variability, but also any non-demonstrative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In a symposium on Chalmers (2012), Chalmers (2014) suggests that he now prefers a different strategy for addressing 
indeterminacy, one that preserves a fully general scrutability thesis by shifting the indeterminacy at issue to scrutabilty itself. This 
alternative approach cannot help E2D+CEI in the present context.  
20 One should note that Chalmers’s initial suggestion for treating Wilson’s cases, by assigning distinct intensions for each 
decision that the natives in fact make (albeit accidentally) is no help here, since the decisions at issue in the present cases are not 
the result of accident. Nor does it make sense to extend Chalmers’s original suggestion (repeated in Chalmers and Jackson 2001) 
by taking standards of non-demonstrative reasoning to be built into associated intensions, such that, e.g., if an appeal to 
fruitfulness pushes chemists to apply ‘acid’ to HCL at some scenario, then its intension includes that principle; for building 
abductive principles into intensions would radically multiply associated concepts, thereby eliminating most if not all substantive 
disagreement—and, contrary to Chalmers (2011), we see that as a serious cost. 
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rational grounds that might push one way or another. Hence, abduction, unlike conceiving, can be 
productive (it is ampliative, after all), allowing those who are identifying intensions to consider how the 
concept should be applied, through the proper use of abduction, even when the application conditions are 
to some extent indeterminate. Since abduction can, in a rational way, go beyond what expressions 
antecedently encode, AEI has the potential to overcome broadly conceptual indeterminacy, extending 
applications of natural kind predicates to new scenarios or situations, on ultimately rational grounds. For 
example, an idealized version of a competent user of 'bird' who has never before seen an airplane would 
plausibly be in position to consider and compare theories of the intensions of 'bird' by attention to which 
theory would be, among other desiderata, most simple, unifying (e.g., of experience of flying entities), 
plausible, explanatorily fruitful, and so on. Similarly, for the cases of ‘mass’, ‘Pluto’, ‘water’, and so on. 
Here it is worth noting, by the way, that there is no barrier to an idealized abductor engaging in such 
extensions of the terms/concepts at issue, for this is more or less what language-users do as a matter of 
course. 
 
3.2 Inability to sort good from bad dispositions 
The second access-based objection is due to Melnyk (2008), who claims that E2D cannot be combined 
with any plausible account of concept possession/content-determination. Melnyk first argues (pp. 269-
271) that E2D fits poorly with externalist accounts (e.g., Millikan 1984; Fodor 1998), according to which 
(roughly speaking) one's possession of a concept depends on one's standing in the right relations to 
external entities, which relations determine the content of the concept. Melnyk next argues that E2D fits 
poorly with internalist accounts, according to which (roughly speaking) one's possession of a concept 
depends only on factors internal to the possessor, which factors determine the content of the concept.  
     Advocates of E2D rightly grant that externalist accounts of concept possession/content-determination 
are not suitably combined with E2D.21 Melnyk’s objection, then, turns on whether any internalist account 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Relatedly, we maintain that the ability to use an expression deferentially is not enough for competence. Stuck in his “Chinese 
Room”, Searle can use ‘水’ to refer to whatever Mandarin speakers refer to with that symbol, but Searle is not thereby competent 
with the associated expression. 
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provides a better fit. Why does Melnyk think none do so? This reflects that any plausible internalist 
account is dispositionalist, such that “to possess a concept with a given content is (at least in part) to have 
a certain set of mental dispositions to use the concept, i.e., dispositions to apply the concept under certain 
circumstances, or to make certain inferences using it, or to do some combination of both” (p. 271).22 If a 
dispositionalist account were suitably combined with E2D, then competent users of a typical natural kind 
expression E could identify its primary intension by checking their dispositions to apply E at various 
scenarios. But competent users can, and typically do, have at least some incorrect dispositions to apply 
such expressions, both due to fallibility and to distance from the end of inquiry. So, a dispositionalist 
account is suitably combined with E2D only if competent users can determine which dispositions reflect 
the true nature of the expressed concept on the basis of their competence alone. Melnyk thinks this cannot 
be done; hence he concludes that no internalist account is suitably combined with E2D. 
     How can advocates of E2D reply? Given CEI, their best hope is along the following lines: 
[O]ne can distinguish concept-constituting mental dispositions from other mental dispositions by the 
acceptably a priori procedure of attending to what one can conceive. Presumably one can do so in this 
way because a concept-constituting mental disposition just is a mental disposition that stands in a certain 
relation to something that one cannot conceive. Corresponding to each mental disposition is a 
generalization, and a disposition is a concept-constituting one iff you cannot conceive a counterexample 
to its corresponding generalization. Thus, imagine you’re disposed to apply SWAN only to birds. 
Because (say) you cannot conceive of a swan that’s not a bird, your disposition is a concept-constituting 
disposition. (Melnyk 2008, p. 276) 
 
As Melnyk compellingly argues, however, having a disposition while being unable to conceive a 
counterexample to its generalization ensures neither that the disposition is central to the concept (i.e., is 
concept-constituting), nor that the generalization is true. His illustrative case is a chef who possesses a 
concept of vinegar, but incorrectly believes that vinegar is formic acid, and so finds it inconceivable that 
anything else be vinegar. To be sure, given complete access to the base truth at a scenario, a suitably 
idealized version of the chef (aware of the chemical/microphysical facts of distribution of substances in 
both labs and kitchens) would be able to identify an inconsistency in her dispositions to apply ‘vinegar’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 According to the main internalist alternative to dispositionalist accounts, competence with a concept C requires explicitly 
associating C with a definition consisting of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. But as Chalmers and Jackson 
(2001, pp. 320-321) note, one can possess concepts (e.g., of knowledge) without being able to identify such conditions. One can 
see that Chalmers and Jackson moreover endorse a dispositional account when they take intuitive reactions (to hypothetical cases, 
conditionals, etc.) to reveal (and be necessary for revealing) a priori knowledge of concepts and relevant intensions. 
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But---and this, we take it, is the crucial point---this inconsistency cannot be resolved by appeal to 
conceiving alone, since seeing the inconsistency does not show which disposition should be rejected. 
Moreover, incorrect dispositions need not conflict with any correct disposition---the latter may have no 
bearing on the former---and thus, one may have an incorrect disposition without there being a relevant 
inconsistency. (To make matters worse, on CEI, the sorting of dispositions into “good” and “bad” must 
eventuate in conclusively justified beliefs.) 
     One might anticipate our response (that’s good, by the way: we’re offering not only a better 
epistemology of intensions, but one that is systematic). Abductors, unlike conceivers, have resources for 
evaluating their dispositions. Consider the chef case. Conceiving may reveal to (an idealized version of) 
the chef that her dispositions to apply ‘vinegar’ are inconsistent. Only abduction, however, allows (an 
idealized version of) the chef to prioritize those dispositions, and so reject the disposition to apply 
‘vinegar’ to formic acid. Only AEI, then, overcomes the likely fact that even at our best we are typically, 
to some extent, incorrectly disposed to apply our expressions/concepts. Of course, the results of 
abduction, such as the chef’s newfound belief that vinegar is not formic acid, will not be justified 
conclusively, even in idealized circumstances. Fortunately, as above, restoring the desirable link between 
necessity and a priority requires only that the results of abduction typically track what the intensions at 
issue are, in fact; and here we have no reason to be pessimistic. 
 
Let us sum up the results of this section. AEI, unlike CEI, makes room for abductive considerations to 
enter into rational reflection, and so, can overcome difficulties in accessing primary intensions that 
undermine E2D+AEI, including those surrounding indeterminacy and incorrect dispositions to apply a 
given term/concept (thus enabling E2D to be supplemented with a plausible and suitable account of 
concept-possession). Hence AEI, unlike CEI, can deliver the comprehensive access to intensions that E2D 
requires. Abductive two-dimensionalism is thus superior to standard conceiving-based versions, in having 
the resources to respond to the various access-based objections. 
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4. Contrasts in application and explanatory power 
We have argued that abduction provides the basis for effectively replying to access-based objections; for 
it often can deliver primary intensions where conceiving cannot. It follows that abduction and conceiving 
sometimes deliver different primary (and hence secondary) intensions. We now illustrate, by attention to 
the case that is often at the forefront of discussions of E2D---namely, the mind-body problem---how these 
different versions of E2D might deliver different generalized secondary intensions even given constant 
primary intensions. This discussion also serves to illustrate another advantage of AEI over CEI, 
independent of those associated with E2D---namely, that AEI makes better sense of both actual 
philosophical practice and disagreement. 
 
4.1 On the possibility of zombies: characterizing actual practice 
Zombies are minimal physical duplicates of ordinary people. They differ from us, nonetheless, in that 
they are not conscious. A zombie scenario is a scenario in which there are zombies; a zombie world is a 
world in which there are zombies. CEI implies that the primary intension of (relevant uses of) ‘zombie’ 
has a positive extension at some scenario if one can conceive of a zombie scenario, and that the secondary 
intension of (relevant uses of) ‘zombie’ has a positive extension at some world if one can conceive of a 
zombie world (i.e., conceive of a zombie scenario on the hypothesis that our very own world is actual). 
So, given E2D, CEI implies that, if one can conceive of a zombie world, then zombies are possible, which 
(given plausible assumptions) implies that consciousness is not physical. E2D thus implies that 
considerations dealing with, for example, mental causation and parsimony (so often invoked in this 
context to support physicalism) are not just outweighed by countervailing considerations, but are 
moreover irrelevant when exploring the mind-body problem. 
     By contrast, abductive two-dimensionalism can assign such considerations an important role. Suppose 
that the causal efficacy of consciousness is an explanandum for the theories at issue (i.e., the propositional 
representations of intensions for relevant terms, such as ‘zombie’ and ‘pain’). Accordingly, any such 
theory “scores points” for accounting for, and “loses points” for precluding, mental causation. Suppose 
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also that consciousness can be efficacious only if it is physical. Given these suppositions, a theory can 
explain the explanandum in question only if it allows that consciousness is physical. In turn, only a theory 
that gives (relevant uses of) ‘zombie’ a null extension at every world allows that consciousness is 
physical. As such, the latter intension can potentially explain something that an intension that gives 
(relevant uses of) 'zombie' a non-null extension at some world cannot. Insofar as principles of explanatory 
comprehensiveness are among the abductive principles, then, AEI makes room for considerations 
pertaining to mental causation to be relevant to exploring the mind-body problem. A similar point can be 
made as regards parsimony. To be sure, the final abduction will involve many principles, many 
explananda, and a balancing---and perhaps the theory that consciousness is not physical can explain 
mental causation after all, and more generally, will provide the best explanation of the explananda at issue 
(cf. Robinson 2016). The present point is just this: AEI makes these considerations relevant, which opens 
up the possibility that the intension of (relevant uses of) ‘zombie’ (‘pain’, etc.) is at odds with that which 
follows upon mere conceiving. 
     Consider, more generally, how the dispute surrounding the mind-body problem actually proceeds. 
Those who believe that consciousness is physical typically offer various considerations to support their 
belief. Even those who think that zombies are misconceived (in that the primary intension of (relevant 
uses of) ‘zombie’ has no non-null extension) rarely nakedly insist that that decides the issue. Rather, they 
point to considerations pertaining to, e.g., induction---e.g., that other initially mysterious phenomena have 
turned out to be physically explainable (cf., Smart 1959). These considerations, taken together, are 
supposed to count for something, regardless of what one can conceive. Whereas this practice is 
inexplicable given CEI, on AEI, it makes perfect sense. 
 
5.2 AEI and the appropriate accommodation of disagreement 
The dispute over the possibility of zombies provides concrete illustration of how abductive two-
dimensionalism, and more generally, AEI, accommodates disagreement among equally competent 
disputants. AEI makes any and all principles that might guide rational thought relevant to the 
	  29	  
epistemology of intensions. This methodological breadth enables AEI to treat disagreement in a way that 
CEI cannot. To start, as the ongoing debate over the possibility of zombies illustrates, equally competent 
speakers can disagree about the extension of a token expression, despite agreeing about the relevant 
descriptive facts (concerning, in particular, the base truth as expressed in semantically neutral language). 
CEI implies that such disputants are talking past one another---expressing different concepts with the 
same expression, a consequence that Chalmers (2011) embraces, misguidedly in our view.23 If, for 
example, Chalmers and Jackson disagree about the extension of (relevant uses of) ‘zombie’ at some 
scenario (and they do), then the proponent of CEI (as they are) must maintain either that at least one 
disputant is not thinking clearly, or that they are talking past one another. AEI, by way of contrast, allows 
such differences in judgments to reflect neither incompetence nor failure to recognize merely 
terminological disagreement, but rather, differences in disputants’ views on which abductive principles 
are at issue, how the principles should be balanced in this case, which explananda belong to which 
theories/intensions, and so on. As with the dispute over the possibility of zombies, we think that some, 
and perhaps many, such disputes are substantive. In making such explanatory room for substantive 
disagreement, AEI is superior to CEI. 
     The role that AEI assigns to experience also helps account for substantive disagreement. As we discuss 
below, AEI allows that certain abductive parameters can be fixed by experience.24 Such honing will 
plausibly sometimes affect which extensions one who uses abduction assigns to relevant expressions; for 
example, which properties one is willing to inductively project may affect which extensions one assigns 
to a given expression. AEI thus makes room for different experiences to yield substantive disagreement 
about intensions. One might wonder whether CEI could replicate this advantage, either by taking concepts 
to tacitly contain reference to abductive principles and parameters, or by reference to the role experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Chalmers (2011) argues directly that disputes not expressible using basic concepts are terminological. Interestingly, since 
(independently of E2D) he suspects that the choice of one empirically adequate set of basic concepts over another is largely a 
matter of taste, it seems that there is little if any substantive disagreement, on his view of the matter. While many disputes are no 
doubt terminological and distinguishing substantive from terminological disputes can be quite difficult, we doubt that there is so 
little substantive dispute. 
24 To prefigure, this role for experience is relevantly like its role in concept acquisition: in both cases, experience provides certain 
content needed to engage in epistemic deliberation, without undermining the broadly formal or structural reasons for thinking 
that the products of abductive deliberation are a priori. 
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might play in teaching conceivers to be appropriately imaginative. But neither strategy accommodates 
substantive disagreement. The first strategy multiples concepts, requiring a distinct concept for each 
distinct abductive parameter, and renders disputes involving those concepts merely verbal. As for the 
second, first note that given that the results of CEI are required to be conclusive, the role of experience 
must be the same for each competent user of a given language. In terms of a "principles and parameters" 
approach (see the next section for further discussion): for each language the parameter(s) may take only a 
single value. Hence the requirement of conclusive knowledge prevents experience from "tweaking" 
conceivability parameters in a way that would make room for substantive disagreement among speakers 
of the same language. 	  
5. Abduction as a priori 
One might accept that AEI and CEI deliver different results, and even that the former is superior to the 
latter for the reasons we have offered, and yet doubt that advocates of E2D should adopt AEI on the 
ground that AEI cannot deliver appropriately a priori knowledge because, as is commonly supposed, 
abduction is an a posteriori mode of inference. We now offer some considerations against this common 
supposition, and in particular we argue that abductive deliberation is as capable of delivering a priori 
justification as conceiving; see Biggs and Wilson (2016) for a more general and more thorough 
motivation for the a priority of abduction. Our discussion takes for granted that (contra, e.g., van Frassen 
1980) abduction can yield knowledge, and focuses on establishing that abduction can yield a priori 
knowledge. 
     What makes knowledge a priori? To start, note that there are four ways in which experience might 
play a role in the course of a particular belief in p coming to be justified. Experience might play a role in: 
(1) acquiring the concepts that are required to entertain p, 
(2) acquiring the evidence that is required to justify belief in p, 
	  31	  
(3) justifying belief in the epistemic value25 of the mode of inference inferential procedures that 
are required to justify belief in p, or 
(4) acquiring the inferential procedures that are required to justify belief in p. 
Can a belief for which experience plays an ineliminable role along one or more of (1)-(4) be justified 
(“entirely”) a priori? The answer is: it depends on which role is at issue. 
     In re (1): it is commonly maintained, and advocates of CEI endorse, that belief in p can be justified a 
priori even if experience is needed to acquire the concepts that are required to entertain p. For example, 
belief in sisters are siblings can be justified a priori even if we need experience to acquire the concepts 
sister and sibling.26 
     In re (2): it is commonly maintained that belief in p cannot be justified a priori if experience is (at all) 
needed to acquire the evidence supporting p. For example, belief in water is identical with H2O (i.e., in 
water and H2O are a single kind) is commonly held to be justified a posteriori, on grounds that justifying 
it requires, in part, acquiring empirical evidence to the effect that all and only samples of water are 
samples of H2O; hence it is that the associated modal claim (necessarily, water is H2O) is deemed an a 
posteriori necessity. That said, advocates of CEI maintain, as above, that a priori knowledge of intensions 
provides a basis for such a posteriori knowledge: although one cannot know that water is H2O in all 
possible worlds without first learning through experience that the watery stuff is actually H2O (that 
enough of what we have called ‘water’ has been H2O, or whatever---we ignore this complication going 
forward), the conditional claim that if the watery stuff is actually H2O, then water is necessarily H2O, falls 
out of relevant intensions, which are known a priori. 
     In re (3): it is commonly maintained, and advocates of CEI endorse, that belief in p cannot be justified 
a priori if experience is needed to justify the belief that the inferential procedures that are required to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 An inferential procedure m has epistemic value if, for any subject s, conclusion c, and premise(s) p: if s justifiably believes p 
and uses m to infer c from p, then (absent defeaters) s justifiably believes c. 
26 The ‘can’ here and in discussion of the other roles experience might play in justifying a given belief is to be understood as 
‘can, in the circumstances’. Belief in some claims (e.g., the four-color theorem) admit of both a priori and a posteriori 
justification, but our question here is not whether a belief that was justified, e.g., by means of a computer proof, can be justified 
in some different, a priori, fashion, but rather the question of whether, given the specific means by which the belief was justified, 
is the resulting justification a priori. 
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justify belief in p have epistemic value. As we will discuss shortly, it is this role for experience that is the 
primary basis for the common thought that abduction is not an a priori mode of inference, with the 
suggestion being that the epistemic value of abductive principles, hence of abduction, is an empirical 
matter. 
     In re (4): although the role of experience in an agent’s acquiring or learning how to deploy a given 
inferential procedure is not much discussed (nor by proponents of CEI), it seems reasonable to maintain 
that this role is relevantly similar to that of (1): in each case experience contributes to belief (or 
supposition) formation, not to justification. For example, students often need encouragement to think in 
an appropriately imaginative way about what is possible; but that such imaginative “training up” is 
required in order to engage in suitably competent conceiving is not taken to undermine the status of 
conceiving as an a priori mode of inference. Hence it seems reasonable to maintain that belief in p can be 
justified a priori even if experience is required in order to acquire or learn how to deploy the inferential 
mode at issue. 
     How do advocates of AEI---how do we---view the bearing of roles 1-4 on a priority? We take roughly 
the same stances as advocates of CEI on 1-3. Since our stances on 1-2 are identical with theirs, we say 
nothing more about them. Since our stance on 3 invites different dialectical burdens, we discuss it in some 
detail. We also discuss our stance on 4 in some detail since it may differ from theirs; since they don't 
discuss 4, we cannot be sure. 
     What makes the dialectical burdens for CEI and AEI differ regarding 3? Advocates of CEI must show 
that experience need not play a role in learning that conceiving has epistemic value; we must show the 
same for abduction. This claim---that the epistemic value of abduction, including that of its underlying 
principles, can be established a priori---is uncommon. Nonetheless, it is arguably true, as we now show.  
     To start, for any equally explanatory theories T and T*, if T scores at least as well and in some cases 
better than T* on every theoretical virtue, then choosing T* over T would be irrational. We can thus 
know a priori that “counter-abduction” does not have epistemic value. Conversely, if T does as well and 
sometimes better than competitors on every theoretical virtue, then choosing T is rational. We can thus 
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know a priori that abduction has epistemic value. The point extends to individual abductive principles. 
For any theories T and T*, if T* is more convoluted than T, and T and T* are otherwise equal, then 
choosing T* over T would be irrational. We can thus know a priori that “counter-parsimony” does not 
have epistemic value. Conversely, if T is more parsimonious than T*, and T and T* are otherwise equal, 
then choosing T over T* would be rational. We can thus know a priori that a principle of parsimony has 
epistemic value. These asymmetries are illuminated, as we see it, by the broadly transcendental 
supposition that abduction and its principles are constitutive of human reasoning: like principles of logical 
inference, the epistemic value of abduction and associated principles is a necessary precondition for the 
possibility of human reasoning.27 We contend, then, that we can know a priori that abduction and its 
underlying principles have epistemic value. Though these considerations invite further discussion, they 
suffice to motivate our position on 3; moreover, we have here gone further toward meeting our dialectical 
burden in re 3 than advocates of CEI go toward meeting theirs. 
     One might object that following, say, counter-parsimony would be irrational only because our world 
happens to be parsimonious (or otherwise such that following counter-parsimony typically would lead us 
to falsehoods), and correspondingly following parsimony is rational only because our world happens to be 
parsimonious (or otherwise such that following parsimony typically leads us to truth); and so, in order to 
justifiably believe that following counter-parsimony would be irrational and following parsimony is 
rational, one must learn through experience what kind of world we occupy---and so, for any belief that is 
justified through abduction, experience must play a role along (3), and so, abduction cannot deliver the a 
priori knowledge that E2D requires. We argue below, in responding to a concern raised by Chalmers and 
Jackson (2001), that knowledge that our world is parsimonious plays no role in justifying belief in the 
epistemic value of parsimony, and what we say there generalizes to other principles. We cannot explore 
here the more general concern that the epistemic value of these principles hinges on our world being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This follows Kant’s (1781/1998) take on logic. The claim that abductive inference is constitutive of human reasoning is 
independently plausible (cf., Gelman and Markham 1983; Feeney and Heit 2007). Incidentally, we think that abduction is the 
ultimate arbiter of disputes about logical principles (e.g., modus ponens) and their applications as well; but that’s a topic for a 
different paper. 
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(contingently) such that they are truth-conducive. We do address this concern in detail elsewhere, 
however (Biggs and Wilson, 2016), where we argue that our justification for believing that abduction and 
its principles have epistemic value does not rely (and moreover cannot rely) on the belief that they are 
truth-conducive. Very roughly, we argue there, inter alia, that all theoretical virtues include a ceteris 
paribus clause, and any case in which a given abductive principle might at first appear not to be truth-
conducive must be a case in which other explanatory considerations were not equal. 
     Finally, in re 4, we maintain, as advocates of CEI may, that even if acquiring or applying an inferential 
procedure (as distinct from establishing its epistemic value) requires experience, its deliverances can be a 
priori. Why think that experience may be required here? Even if we are natural born abductors, it is 
plausible that experience can tweak parameters associated with abductive principles, affecting, for 
example, the sample size one requires for inductive generalization. Such tweaking is compatible with 
abduction’s being an innate, and indeed necessary, component of our rational cognitive economy. 
Compare the principles and parameters approach to grammar (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik 1993), according 
to which experience gives broadly contingent content to parameters in grammatical structures that are in 
the relevant sense necessary, in being determined independently of experience and common among all 
speakers of anything we would recognize as language. Similarly, in the case of abduction, experience 
gives broadly contingent content to parameters in epistemic structures that are determined independently 
of experience, and (as suggested above) common among all thinkers engaging in anything we would 
recognize as right reasoning. This role for experience is relevantly like its role in concept acquisition: in 
both cases, experience provides certain content needed to engage in epistemic deliberation, without 
undermining the broadly formal or structural reasons (such as those we gave in re 3) for thinking that 
abductive deliberation is an a priori mode of inference. 
     We conclude, therefore, that the deliverances of AEI are “as a priori as” those of CEI, and so, are “a 
priori enough” to allow E2D to fulfill its promise. 	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5.1 Abductive principles are norms 
Do existing advocates of E2D have a ready-made reply to this claim that abduction is an a priori mode of 
inference? Though none explicitly consider AEI, Chalmers and Jackson come close to considering 
abduction as a means to identifying intensions when rejecting Block and Stalnaker’s (1999) suggestion 
that “simplicity” might play an inescapable role in reductive analysis. Here, we extract an objection to 
AEI from that discussion (2001, pp. 342-350). There is, to be sure, a crucial difference between the 
objection to AEI that we develop, and what Chalmers and Jackson say about simplicity. The difference is 
inescapable because we think of abduction as involving a priori principles, while their discussion 
presents simplicity as an empirical fact. Indeed, it is due to this difference that their reply to Block and 
Stalnaker misses the mark when directed against AEI.28 
     As an example of an abductive principle, take the principle that one should prefer parsimonious 
theories. Call the following (rough) specification Parsimony: for any theories T and T*, and property F, if 
T differs from T* only in that T* includes Fs as basic but T does not, then ceteris paribus we are more 
justified in believing T. Now, given a scenario s, where D is the base truth at s, and A is some ordinary 
truth that one can infer somehow or other from D, the Chalmers-Jackson-inspired objection to AEI 
proceeds as follows. On the one hand, if s is not parsimonious, Parsimony is at best irrelevant and at 
worst misleading when inferring A; hence Parsimony cannot play a role in justifying belief in A. On the 
other hand, if s is parsimonious, one can derive Parsimony from D; hence Parsimony cannot play an 
essential role in justifying belief in A. Recall that on E2D the epistemology for inferring ordinary truths 
from base truths is the epistemology of intensions. So, Parsimony plays no essential justificatory role in 
the epistemology of intensions. Generalizing from the case of Parsimony, abduction plays no such role. 
     Consider first the objector’s premise that Parsimony cannot play a justificatory role when assessing a 
scenario that is not parsimonious. We are suspicious of two aspects of this premise. First, we doubt one 
can make sense of a scenario's being un-parsimonious. Second, even if one can make sense of this, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Chalmers (2012) rehearses the Chalmers-Jackson (2001) discussion of simplicity-qua-empirical-truth, and offers nothing else 
that’s relevant to AEI. 
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think Parsimony can play a justificatory role when assessing un-parsimonious scenarios. 
     What might it be for a scenario to be un-parsimonious? Is our world un-parsimonious because it has 
more than one kind? How many kinds must a world have to be un-parsimonious? Two? Three? Forty-
two? These questions are silly precisely because Parsimony is a principle that guides theory choice, not a 
fact that holds (or not) depending on the scenario. Perhaps one can see how the proposition the world is 
parsimonious could be false at a complex scenario---our world is pretty complex; perhaps it is false here. 
But, again, we do not think of abductive principles as propositions of this sort; they are principles, norms 
that guide theory choice. If a scenario is un-parsimonious, then, it is not in virtue of a proposition being 
false at that scenario, but is rather in virtue of . . . what? 
     Perhaps a scenario is un-parsimonious just in case, ceteris paribus, one who uses Parsimony would do 
worse than one who uses Anti-Parsimony: for any theories T and T* and property F, if T differs from T* 
only in that T* includes Fs as basic but T does not, then ceteris paribus we are more justified in believing 
T*. But what reason could one have to prefer Anti-Parsimony to Parsimony? Given that all other things 
are equal, why should one prefer a theory that includes Fs as basic to one that includes Fs as derivative? 
No experience could cut either way. Nor do we see any a priori consideration that might cut against 
Parsimony. We suspect that there is no more a scenario where one (epistemically) should follow Anti-
Parsimony than there is a scenario where one (morally) should harm others for fun. The details of the 
scenario are simply irrelevant. 
     Suppose, nonetheless, that one can make sense of a scenario's being un-parsimonious, that s is such a 
scenario, and that Parsimony would lead one to wrongly conclude that A is false at s. The objector thinks 
that Parsimony cannot play a justificatory role when assessing s, since Parsimony misleads us. Recall, 
however, that a central goal of E2D is to explain our expressions and our use-of/reasoning-with those 
expressions (and associated concepts), pertaining, in particular, to their intensions and the modal profiles 
of their referents. Given these goals, it is natural to use our principles, even when assessing scenarios 
where they mislead. If assessment of scenarios need not respect the principles we actually use, how can it 
be relevant to how we think? Should an account of our a priori deliberation take into account the in-
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principle viability of counter-induction, anti-bivalence, and the like? Arguably, such inferential 
aberrations should play no more role in an account of the epistemology of intensions than should the sort 
of meta-semantic variations of ‘tiger’ (as, e.g., referring to couches) that, we presume, are irrelevant to 
E2D. 
     The second premise of the Chalmers-Jackson-inspired objection holds that Parsimony cannot play a 
justificatory role when assessing parsimonious scenarios. If the first premise misses the mark, so does the 
second; for it would be astounding if Parsimony could play a justificatory role except when assessing 
parsimonious scenarios! The presupposition that a scenario can be parsimonious, moreover, is no more 
plausible than the presupposition that a scenario can be un-parsimonious. 
     It is nonetheless informative to consider the second premise in more detail. According to the objector, 
Parsimony cannot play a justificatory role when assessing parsimonious scenarios, because one could 
derive the fact of their parsimony from base truths. In order for the objection to succeed, one must be able 
to derive “the fact” that the world is parsimonious from base truths (at parsimonious scenarios) by 
conceiving. This implausibly requires that (at parsimonious scenarios) it is inconceivable for the base 
truths to hold and the fact “the world is parsimonious” to be false. What truths might be inconceivable in 
conjunction with this “fact”? Not truths about the number of kinds (two, three, forty-two) that a scenario 
includes; for even modulo the concern that Parsimony is a principle as opposed to a fact, one can 
conceive that a world is parsimonious even though it includes many kinds. Moreover, even if one can 
derive the fact that the world is parsimonious from base truths at any parsimonious scenario through 
conceiving (whatever that means), perhaps Parsimony can play more than a “mediating” role in assessing 
such scenarios. Suppose that one uses bivalent logic to argue for multi-valued logic. Does this show that 
multi-valued logic plays at most a mediating role (not a justifying role) in belief formation? Plausibly not, 
for one who concludes that multi-valued logic should replace bivalent logic might well reassess 
inferences that were initially made using bivalent logic. Similarly, one who derives Parsimony from base 
truths at a scenario via conceiving might well use Parsimony to reassess inferences that were made by 
conceiving; for example, one who first uses conceiving to conclude both that mind and body are distinct 
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and that Parsimony is true might then use Parsimony to reassess the inference that led to the former 
conclusion, perhaps concluding (through Parsimony) that mind and body are one. 
     Thus the Chalmers-Jackson-inspired objection to the claim that the results of abductive deliberation 
are a priori fails. Since Chalmers and Jackson come no closer to addressing abduction than this, their 
work contains no ready-made objection to abductive two-dimensionalism. One might wonder, however, 
whether an objection would emerge were they to clarify how conceiving works. Aside from their 
insistence that conceiving does not involve abductive principles, however, what little they say cuts the 
other way. The claim that conceiving is “rational reflection” does not preclude abduction. Nor does the 
intimation that conceiving is akin to “seeing” concepts; for it is likely that justification-conferring 
perceiving involves (perhaps tacit) abduction—e.g., knowing that there’s a table in front of me, as 
opposed to a hallucination or a table-shaped array of sense data, plausibly requires using abduction (cf., 
Russell 1912/2009). Of course, one could insist that rational insight and abduction involve distinct 
cognitive faculties. Perhaps this un-parsimonious view would be plausible if abduction could not yield a 
priori knowledge of relevant intensions. But, as we have argued, abduction can yield such a priori 
knowledge.29 	  
6. Does abduction deliver incorrect results? 
Even granting that abductive two-dimensionalism has certain advantages over E2D+CEI, one might be 
concerned that abduction will too often deliver intensions that are incorrect, so that conceiving must 
remain the ultimate route to (and arbiter of disputes about) intensions (perhaps supplemented by appeals 
to abduction as filling out intensions when conceiving alone falls short). This concern might be thought to 
beg the question against AEI, if it presupposes that abduction’s deliverances are wrong whenever it and 
some other method (presumably, conceiving) come into conflict. Nonetheless, if abduction were to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Though Chalmers and Jackson deny that abductive principles enter into the epistemology of intensions, their reply to Block 
and Stalnaker offers an alternative place for such principles, as partly constitutive of individual concepts. On this view, appeal to 
abductive principles in the course of considering how to apply an expression would be compatible with the outcome of the 
deliberation’s being a priori. But as previously noted, it is a bad idea to build abductive principles into concepts, since doing so 
prevents there being substantive disagreement over the extensions of what are intuitively univocal expressions; see §4.2 for 
further relevant discussion of disagreement. 
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frequently deliver intensions at odds with strong intuitive judgments, that would indeed be a cost. 
     To start: is there reason to expect abduction to frequently deliver primary intensions at odds with 
strong intuitive judgments? Our discussion of abduction qua guide to primary intensions provides no 
reason to think it will. Indeed, that discussion suggests that abduction and conceiving mostly converge 
vis-à-vis primary intensions because, as per footnote 13, the explananda that serve as input to abduction 
given AEI are (at least typically) similar, if not equivalent, to the intuitive judgments that are crucial for 
determining primary intensions given CEI. Of course, this similarity does not ensure that AEI and CEI 
will produce the same results, precisely because abduction, being ampliative, can impact the input in ways 
that conceiving cannot. Nonetheless, it suggests that abduction will at most infrequently deliver primary 
intensions at odds with strong intuitive judgments. To be sure, as per our discussion of access-based 
objections to E2D, abduction will frequently deliver determinate intensions where intuition is silent, but 
that very silence ensures that in such cases abduction is not at odds with strong intuitive judgments. Also 
as per that discussion, in cases where the input (intuitions as well as, e.g., theoretical results) conflicts, 
abduction provides a basis for reconciling the input, sometimes by deeming some intuitive judgment false 
or incorrect---but that's just to be expected, and in the cases at issue, desired. 
     Should we expect abduction to frequently deliver secondary intensions at odds with strong intuitive 
judgments? Here again we think not, and below we gesture at why. We start, however, by blocking an 
argument that it will do so. 
     In discussing the intension of ordinary tokens of ‘water’, we suggested that a principle of parsimony, 
and hence perhaps abduction (assuming that other explanatory virtues are equal between the candidate 
intensions), supports a secondary intension for ‘water’ that is consistent with its being identical with H2O 
but not with its being (wholly) distinct from H2O. In discussing zombies we suggested that a principle of 
parsimony, and hence perhaps abduction, supports an intension for ordinary tokens of ‘pain’ that is 
consistent with physicalism but not dualism. An objector might take these examples to imply that 
abduction always, or at least too often, supports the most parsimonious theory, and so will often be at 
odds with strong intuitive judgments. For example, since the theory that chordate and renate are the same 
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kind is more parsimonious than the theory that they are (wholly) distinct kinds, the objector might 
suppose that abduction will deliver secondary intensions on which appropriate tokens of ‘chordate’ and 
‘renate’ have the same modal extension, contra our strong intuitive judgment that these kinds are modally 
separable (even though actually coincident). 
     In response, we start by reiterating that abduction is not based only in considerations of parsimony; as 
such, assigning parsimony a role when choosing among competing secondary intensions does not imply 
that this role will be determinative of the outcome. Suppose that a theory on which relevant tokens of 
‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ have distinct secondary intensions explains something better than any theory on 
which they have the same secondary intension. In that case, the outcome of the abductive inference will 
depend on how parsimony should be balanced against (perhaps inter alia) the extra explanatory power to 
be gained by not assigning the terms the same modal extension. To be sure, if all other explanatory 
considerations are equal, abduction pushes towards the most parsimonious theory, but that seems right, 
not problematic. If a theory on which ‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ have distinct secondary intensions offers no 
explanatory advantages over one on which they have the same secondary intension---if the first theory is 
not more systematic than the second, doesn't explain anything that the second theory can't explain, etc.---
why suppose that they have distinct secondary intensions? This is tricky ground for the objector to 
navigate: pressing this objection requires identifying a reason R to assign ‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ distinct 
secondary intensions such that abduction would not suggest that these terms have distinct secondary 
intensions when it takes R into account, as abduction would be bound to do. 
     The objector, then, must identify a reason that suggests that relevant tokens of ‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ 
have distinct secondary intensions but that cannot itself be incorporated into abduction in a way that 
would lead abduction to deliver different modal extensions for these terms. Here, the objector might 
appeal to conceivability itself, saying, “Our ability to conceive of chordates that are not renates provides 
our only reason to think that chordate and renate are distinct kinds, and hence that relevant uses of 
‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ have distinct secondary intensions. Given AEI, this reason cannot trump the 
dictates of parsimony, since otherwise AEI would fail to be distinguished from CEI. So, abduction, 
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contrary to strong intuitive judgment, must suggest that ‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ have the same modal 
extension.” We offer two independent responses to this proposal. 
     First, and most importantly, we think that our confidence that abduction tracks the metaphysical 
structure of the world should be greater than our confidence in any single intuitive judgment (supported 
by no further considerations), however strong it may be. Accordingly, if the conceivability of a chordate 
that is not a renate provides our only reason to think that chordate and renate are distinct kinds, and 
abductive principles suggest that they are the same kind, then, we claim, we should follow abduction and 
conclude that they are the same kind. The objector might respond that cases in which conceivability and 
only conceivability suggests that entities are distinct are common, and we should weigh our confidence 
that abduction tracks the metaphysical structure of the world against our confidence that at least most of 
the strong intuitive judgments that reflect such conceivability gets things right. But we see no antecedent 
reason to think that such cases are common. Indeed, we think that the chordate-renate case is recycled so 
often because such cases are rare. 
     Second, the objector’s paradigm case (chordate-renate) should be controversial. Suppose that the 
narrow functional roles of hearts and kidneys (respectively, roughly pumping blood and filtering blood) 
do not determine their respective essences, but rather, their place within a larger blood servicing system 
determines their respective essences, such that part of the essence of hearts is to be connected in the right 
way to kidneys and vice versa. Given this supposition, chordate and renate are modally inseparable, and 
correspondingly, relevant tokens of ‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ have the same modal extension, and so, the 
objection fails.30 Suppose, instead, that the narrow functional roles of hearts and kidneys determine their 
respective essences. Given this supposition, we can model (nomologically possible) chordates that are not 
renates, and so, the bare conceivability of chordates that are not renates does not provide our only reason 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Two views of the nature of chordates and renates are compatible with this result. On one, hearts and kidneys are necessarily 
connected because they are different components of a single kind, and so, chordate and renate are the same kind---a principle of 
parsimony supports this view. On the other, hearts and kidneys are necessarily connected even though they are distinct 
existences, and so, chordate and renate are distinct kinds even though they are inseparable (and correspondingly, even though 
relevant tokens of ‘chordate’ and ‘renate’ have the same modal extension). Of course, this may violate Hume’s Dictum---
according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct existences---but we do not see this as a serious cost (see 
Wilson 2010 for discussion). 
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to think that chordate and renate are modally separable, and so, the objection fails.31 Of course, one might 
deny that either broad or narrow functional role determines the essences of hearts and kidneys. These 
considerations challenge, nonetheless, the objector’s premise that abduction produces results clearly at 
odds with strong intuitive judgment in the chordate-renate case. 
     We have suggested that there is no clear reason to expect that abduction will frequently deliver 
secondary intensions at odds with strong intuitive judgments. We now gesture at two reasons to think 
that, on the contrary, abduction will frequently deliver secondary intensions in conformity with such 
judgments, each of which requires more exploration than we can offer here. First, plausibly, abduction 
typically tracks strong intuitive judgments vis-à-vis secondary intensions because such judgments stem 
from tacit abduction (cf. Biggs 2011)---though, because various factors (e.g., cognitive biases) may 
impact tacit abduction in ways in which they do not impact explicit abduction, abduction will not 
perfectly track strong intuitive judgments. Second, plausibly, abduction will contradict intuitive 
judgments mostly when they are not especially strong, because intuitive judgments are especially strong 
when they are part of a network of mutually reinforcing considerations (many of which are broadly 
theoretical) that support the content of the intuitive judgment, and in such cases abduction typically will 
support that same content. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We have argued that abductive two-dimensionalism---E2D+AEI---has two important advantages over 
E2D+CEI. First, as compared to conceiving (understood as per CEI), abduction can deliver a wider range 
of primary (and hence secondary) intensions, and so provide a basis for knowledge of a wider range of 
modal truths, including those about natural kinds. This result is crucial for realizing the aim and promise 
of E2D as explaining our knowledge of a wide range of modal truths (especially those involving natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For example, given this supposition, we can build a model of a (nomologically possible) creature that has one organ for 
pumping blood and no organ for filtering blood because whenever the blood becomes so full of waste and excess fluid that the 
blood-pumping organ cannot use it, it acquires new blood (think vampires) and excretes the old, or a creature that has one organ 
for pumping blood, but for which the filtering functions that are served by the kidneys in actual mammals are instead distributed 
throughout various tissues that serve multiple functions, and which collectively have no claim to being a kidney. 
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kinds) as a consequence of our knowledge of corresponding intensions (including those of natural kind 
terms). Second, abduction can explain actual practice surrounding philosophical theorizing (and 
correspondingly choice of secondary intensions) without either implying that widespread philosophical 
practice is nonsensical, or trivializing most philosophical disagreement as non-substantive. In each case, 
abduction’s advantage results from it being methodologically broad, incorporating any theoretical virtues 
there may be, by way of positive contrast with conceiving, which is methodologically narrow, 
incorporating only intuitive judgments (or something relevantly similar). 
     We also have considered and rejected two prima facie tempting objections to abductive two-
dimensionalism. The first objection is that abduction cannot deliver the specifically a priori knowledge 
that E2D requires, since abduction, being an a posteriori mode of inference, cannot deliver a priori 
knowledge. In response (and drawing on our 2016), we have argued that, contrary to common opinion, 
abduction is an a priori mode of inference, and in particular that abduction is as a priori as conceiving. 
The second objection is that abduction will too often deliver results that are “wrong”, in being at odds 
with strong intuitive judgments. In response, we have noted that contradicting strong intuitive judgment 
does not in itself constitute delivering the wrong result, we have argued that we have no reason to believe 
that abduction will frequently contradict especially strong intuitive judgments, and we have sketched 
reasons for thinking that, on the contrary, abduction will typically preserve strong intuitive judgments 
about both primary and secondary intensions, notwithstanding departures from such judgments inspired 
by incompatible dispositions or other input into theorizing about intensions (as in Melnyk's chef case) or 
appropriate attention to the full range of relevant explanatory considerations (as perhaps may be in the 
case of zombies). 
     We find, then, that abductive two-dimensionalism is superior to E2D+CEI, and more generally, is an 
attractive approach to meaning and modality, as per the E2D strategy. 
     The significance of AEI, moreover, goes beyond that of abductive two-dimensionalism, and indeed 
should be of interest to anyone concerned with the question of whether semantic or conceptual analysis 
plays a crucial role in philosophical theorizing---that is, in arriving at philosophical truth, constituting 
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philosophical practice, and/or explaining philosophical disagreement. On the one hand, if one does take 
such analysis to play such a crucial role, then even if one rejects E2D, one's view will likely be subject to 
analogues of the access-based objections to E2D, undermining the basis for systematically treating 
philosophical truth, practice, and/or disagreement; but if such analysis proceeds via abduction (understood 
as per AEI), analogues of our responses to the access-based objections to E2D can be fruitfully brought to 
bear. On the other hand, many who deny that semantic or conceptual analysis plays a crucial role vis-a-vis 
philosophical theorizing do so primarily on grounds that such analysis is inadequate to play this role, as is 
supposedly illustrated by the need to appeal to abduction in order, e.g., to construct or choose between 
competing philosophical theories. If such analysis must proceed by way of conceiving, then this line of 
thought is probative; but if such analysis can proceed by way of abduction, then this line of thought 
becomes a non sequitur. Accordingly, both those who accept and those who deny that semantic and 
conceptual analysis plays a crucial role in philosophical theorizing should be interested in our proposal. 
AEI is not only the best epistemology for E2D, but moreover, and more generally, represents the basis for 
a new and promising account of semantic and conceptual analysis. 
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